This paper studies optimal organization structures in multidivisional organizations with more than two divisions. The decisions of individual divisions need to be adapted to local conditions and also be coordinated. The needs for coordination are described by a coordination network. Information about local conditions is held by division managers who communicate strategically. Hierarchy is an organizational form in which divisions are organized into groups, and decisions are made by group managers. Under a circle coordination network, our central result is that when the needs for coordination are intermediate, hierarchy performs better than centralization or decentralization. We then compare M-form hierarchy (in which mutually more dependent divisions are grouped together) and U-form hierarchy (in which mutually less dependent divisions are grouped together). We also consider other coordination networks, in which di¤erent divisions have di¤erent network positions. Hierarchy, or some hybrid governance which combines hierarchy and centralization, remains optimal in some situations.
Introduction
An important question in organization economics is what organizational form strikes a better balance between adaptation and coordination for a multidivisional organization. On the one hand, each division's activity needs to be adapted to its local condition. On the other hand, the activities of various divisions also need to be coordinated. Since individual division managers are usually best informed about their own local conditions, inducing them to communicate e¤ectively is critical in achieving coordinated adaptation.
For an organization with more than two divisions (functional units), organizational forms other than centralization (in which headquarters make decisions for the divisions) and decentralization (in which division managers make the decisions) are possible. One such possibility is hierarchical governance: divisions are organized into several groups, and for each group a group manager is introduced to make decisions for the divisions within his group. Indeed, in the real world hierarchical governance is ubiquitous in large multi-divisional organizations. For instance, in addition to the headquarters, multinational …rms typically set up groups or regional headquarters (in Asia, Europe, North America, etc.) to coordinate divisional activities. Chandler (1977) is among the …rst to note the importance of hierarchical governance. He stated that "the existence of managerial hierarchy is a de…ning characteristic of the modern business enterprise." Speci…cally, Chandler (1962) identi…ed three layers of management at the top level: departments (functional units), divisions (each of which has a number of departments), and headquarters (oversee all divisions). Moreover, he pointed out two typical ways in which large …rms group functional units into divisions: M-form (multidivisional) or U-form (unitary). Under M-form, complementary functional units are grouped together into divisions (organized according to products or regions), while under U-form, similar functional units are grouped together.
Given the popularity of hierarchical governance in the business world, the following questions naturally arise. Why do large …rms adopt hierarchical governance (i.e., introduce a middle layer of management) at the top level of management? What are the advantages and disadvantages of hierarchical governance relative to centralization and decentralization (i.e., without the middle layer of management), both in terms of achieving informative communication and coordinated adaptation? What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of M-form and U-form?
To address these issues, we consider a multidivisional organization with four divisions. Our model is an extension of the two-division models of Alonso et al. (2008; ADM henceforth) and Rantakari (2008) . 1 Speci…cally, each division has a decision to make, which needs to be adapted to its local condition. Moreover, the decisions of di¤erent divisions also need to be coordinated, and the needs for coordination are described by a weighted coordination network. Information is dispersed within the organization: each division's local condition is only observed by its division manager, whose incentive is to maximize the payo¤ of his own division. Communication among division managers is strategic or in the form of cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) . Finally, the organization is only able to commit to ex ante allocation of decision rights.
The timing is as follows. First, the headquarter (HQ), whose incentive is to maximize the joint payo¤ of all four divisions, determines the allocation of decision rights, or the governance structure. Then all division managers simultaneously send public messages. Messages are public, in the sense that all relevant parties receive the same message from any given division manager. Finally, decisions are made simultaneously by the parties who have decision rights.
We …rst study a circle (coordination) network, which is typical in the real world. For instance, consider a multinational operating in two regions, the US and Asia; each region has two functional centives of the division managers are su¢ ciently aligned. 3 Rantakari (2008) focuses on a setting with two asymmetric divisions in which the division managers are completely sel…sh. He considers richer organization forms (partial centralization, for instance) and shows that the optimal governance structure could be asymmetric if the two divisions are too asymmetric. The main di¤erence between our paper and theirs is that we consider more than two divisions. This not only adds realism to the model, but can also incorporate richer structures of coordination needs among divisions (i.e., coordination network). Moreover, more divisions also imply richer ways to allocate decision rights or richer organizational structures. In particular, hierarchy or intermediate layer of management becomes a possibility, which is not the case in a two-division framework. Further di¤erences between our model and their framework will be pointed out as the paper proceeds.
Two recent papers study strategic communication in networks. Hagenbach and Koessler (2010) and Galeotti et al. (2013) consider a setting with multiple senders and multiple receivers. Speci…-cally, there is a common state of the world, and each agent has binary private information. Agents have heterogenous but known biases, and they strategically communicate about their private information before taking action. 4 In Hagenbach and Koessler (2010) , communication is private, in that an agent can send di¤erent messages to di¤erent agents; in Galeotti et al. (2013) , in contrast, communication can be either private or public. They study who will communicate truthfully with whom in equilibrium, which forms a communication network. The focus of our paper is quite different from theirs. For one thing, the trade-o¤ between adaptation and coordination is central to our model-it is not present in theirs. For another, they do not consider the allocation of decision rights or organizational structure.
Calvo-Armengol et al. (2015) also study communication within an organization. 5 In particular, agents'decisions need to be adapted to local conditions and be coordinated with each other; the relevant coordination needs are described by a coordination network. The main di¤erence is that in their model, agents'communication is costly but veri…able, and thus not strategic; their focus is on agents'incentives to invest in bilateral communication links in order to increase the precision of communication. Again, optimal organizational structure is not considered.
Previous work has studied hierarchy from di¤erent perspectives. One approach (cf., Calvo and Wellisz (1978); Qian (1994) ) emphasizes factors such as moral hazard and monitoring to determine the number of hierarchy tiers. Garicano (2000) develops a model of knowledge-based hierarchy: Lower-layer workers deal with common and easy-to-solve problems, while higher-layer workers 3 Delegation of decision rights is also studied in Aghion and Tirole (1997) , Melumad and Shibano (1991) , and Dessein (2002) . 4 In Hagenbach and Koessler (2010) agents'private information is independent but their actions need to be coordinated with the average action among all agents. In Galeotti et al. (2013) agents'private information is correlated. 5 There is an earlier literature that studies information transmission in organizations based on team theory: Marschak and Radner (1972) , Aoki (1986) , Radner (1993) , Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) , Prat (1997) , Van Zandt (1999) , and Hart and Moore (2005) . In these models, information transmissions are not strategic, but are hampered by physical communication contraints. specialize in rare and hard-to-solve problems. The main di¤erence is that while these papers focus on hierarchy in organizing production, our paper studies hierarchy in top-level management.
Studies on M-form and U-form organizations were pioneered by Chandler (1962) and Williamson (1975) . In terms of formal models, Aghion and Tirole (1995) study how overload considerations a¤ect a …rm's choice between M-form and U-form. Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000) analyze the incentive issues related to M-form and U-form as they generate di¤erent information about managers'performance. Qian, Roland and Xu (2006) compare the performance between M-form and U-form organizations in terms of facilitating innovation and reform. 6 In contrast, the focus of our study is, how M-form and U-form organizations achieve a better balance between adaptation and coordination via endogenous communication. Another di¤erence is that while in the previous studies the hierarchical structure is implicitly assumed, in our setting the optimality of hierarchy (relative to centralization and decentralization) emerges endogenously.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: A general model of coordination network is laid out in Section 2, and the structure of equilibrium communication is presented in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes a circle network and studies the optimality of U-form and M-form. Section 5 further explores optimal organizational governance for a star coordination network and a line coordination network. We conclude in Section 6.
Model
There are n = 4 divisions or functional units within an organization. 7 Each division i, labeled as D i , has a corresponding division manager i. For each D i there is a decision to make, which is denoted as d i . Moreover, each D i has a local condition i , which is uniformly distributed on [ s; s], s > 0, with variance 2 . The realization of i is only observed by the division manager of D i . All i s are independent from each other. The decisions of di¤erent divisions also need to be coordinated, the details of which will be speci…ed shortly.
Speci…cally, the payo¤ function of division D i is given by
In (1), all the ij 0 and ii > 0. The …rst term is D i 's adaptation loss, resulting from the di¤erence between d i and its local condition i . The parameter ii captures the importance of D i 's adaptation loss. The second term is D i 's coordination loss, which is due to the di¤erence between d i and d j . The parameter ij captures the importance of d i being coordinated with d j for D i . We will focus on the case in which ij = ji , or each coordination link is symmetric. 8 The n n matrix 6 Dessein et al. (2010) studied hybrid organizations in which some functions are centralized, while the decisions of other functions are decentralized. 7 Our model can be extended to the case with more than four divisions, which will be discussed later in Section 6. 8 When ij and ji are di¤erent, Di and Dj value the coordination need between di and dj di¤erently.
of [ ij ] de…nes a coordination network within the organization, which is undirected and weighted. 9 The model extends ADM's and Rantakari's (2008) two-division models to n divisions. The objective of division manager i is to maximize his own division D i 's payo¤. 10 The organization also has an HQ, whose objective is to maximize the joint payo¤ of all divisions, P i i . We assume that contracts are highly incomplete, so that the organization is only able to commit to an ex ante allocation of decision rights. The game proceeds in three stages. In stage 0, the HQ allocates decision rights: for each D i , who will make decision d i . We call an allocation of decision rights a governance structure g. Once a particular g is determined, it becomes common knowledge. Then individual division managers observe the realized local conditions i s. In stage 1, all division managers simultaneously send public messages regarding their realized local conditions. Denote m i as division manager i's message, and m = (m 1 ; :::; m n ) as a message pro…le. Note that manager i cannot send di¤erent messages to di¤erent parties, as communication is public. In particular, all of the relevant parties hear the same message m i . 11 Finally, in stage 2, all decisions are made simultaneously by the parties who have decision rights, as speci…ed by g.
Given that n = 4, there are many possible ways to allocate decision rights, or many possible governance structures. We will mainly focus on the following. The …rst is centralization, under which the HQ retains the decision rights of all divisions. The second is decentralization, under which each division manager i makes decision d i . These two governance structures serve as benchmarks. The third is hierarchical governance structures. Speci…cally, the HQ organizes divisions into groups, and for each group introduces an intermediate-level manager, who is responsible for making decisions for all divisions within the group (this will be elaborated on later sections). Finally, we also consider some hybrid governance structures. The …rst is partial centralization/decentralization. Under this organizational form, the HQ retains the decision rights of some divisions and the decision rights of other divisions are decentralized. The second hybrid governance is a combination of hierarchy and centralization or decentralization, which will be explained in more detail later.
Our equilibrium solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria (PBE). In particular, in stage 2 the decisions form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium given beliefs. In stage 1, each division manager's communication strategy is optimal, given other division managers'equilibrium communication strategies and the equilibrium decisions in stage 2. Moreover, beliefs are consistent with division managers'equilibrium communication strategies. 9 To be more precise, the iis are the adaptation needs. 1 0 In the real world, division managers could also care about other divisions'payo¤s to some extent. We adopt this maximum con ‡ict of interest, as in Rantakari (2008) , to focus on optimal organizational governance. This assumption will be discussed in more detail in Section 6. 1 1 Public communication is a reasonable assumption, as the communication is between top-level managers. One can think of communications taking place in a meeting with all division managers and other relevant parties present. Actually, when Alfred Sloan was the president of GM, he set up various committees that gave division managers opportunities to exchange ideas and information (Sloan, 1964 ).
Structure of Communication Equilibria
In this section we study communication equilibria in stage 1 for general coordination networks. The results are applicable to all speci…c coordination networks considered later.
By backward induction, we …rst solve for equilibrium decisions in the …nal stage, given governance structure g and messages m in earlier stages. Let d 
where a . 12 In later sections, we will investigate in detail how the weights are determined for speci…c networks.
Next, we consider the communication stage, given governance structure g. As in ADM, we use the following thought experiment to derive division manager i's incentive to misrepresent information. Suppose manager i, by sending message m i , can successfully induce v i as the posterior belief of i among all other parties. Then he will choose v i to maximize his expected payo¤
where d g i and d g j are given by (2) . The optimal v i can be derived as
This b In later sections, for speci…c networks, we will investigate in more detail how b g i is determined by the structure of the coordination network and the governance structure g.
U-form and M-form Hierarchy under a Circle Network
In this section we study a coordination network that is a circle. As illustrated in Figure 1 , there are four coordination links. Two links are strong (12 and 34) and two links are weak (23 and 14) . For each i, we normalize ii to 1. Moreover, 12 = 34 = H , and 23 = 41 = L , H L . More precisely, this network is an asymmetric circle, as coordination links have di¤erent weights. However, all divisions have symmetric network positions, with each division having a strong coordination link and a weak coordination link.
This coordination network structure is typical in the real world. For a concrete example, consider a multinational operating in two regions: the US and Asia. In each region, the multinational has two functional units: production and marketing. Thus there are four divisions in total: US production (D1), US marketing (D2), Asia marketing (D3), and Asia production (D4). The two divisions in the same region (D1 and D2, and D3 and D4) need close coordination, while the same functional divisions across two regions (D1 and D4, D2 and D3) need to be coordinated to some extent. On the other hand, di¤erent functional divisions in di¤erent regions (D1 and D3, D2 and D4) do not need to be directly coordinated. 14 We will study four governance structures. The two benchmarks are centralization and decentralization, denoted C and D, respectively. In addition, we will study two hierarchical governance structures. Speci…cally, the four divisions are organized into two groups, with each group consisting of two divisions. Moreover, a (new) group manager is introduced to each group, who is responsible for making decisions for the two divisions in his own group. The group manager's incentive is to maximize the joint payo¤ of his own two divisions. 15 However, the group manager does not observe the realized states of his divisions; they are still only observed by the relevant division managers, who are responsible for the day-to-day operations of their own divisions. This is a hierarchical governance, as a new layer of managers is introduced between the HQ and the division managers. Note that group managers are equally informationally disadvantaged as the HQ. Actually, the group managers di¤er from the HQ only in their incentives: Relative to the HQ, a group manager's incentive is closer to his own division managers', since a group manager just internalizes one coordination link.
We consider two possible groupings. In the …rst, the two more mutually dependent divisions (D1 and D2, D3 and D4) are grouped together. We call this governance M-form, denoted as M , since in the corresponding example groups are organized according to regions (or products). In the second case, the two weakly linked divisions (D1 and D4, D2 and D3) are grouped together. We call this governance U-form, denoted as U , since in the corresponding example groups are organized according to functions. Under each governance, …rst the division managers simultaneously send public messages, then the group managers simultaneously make decisions. The two hierarchical structures are depicted in Figure 2 . Note that hierarchy does not change the ‡ow of communication. 16 1 5 A group manager's pay, and/or his future promotion and career, could be tied to the overall performance of the two divsions under his supervision. More generally, this demonstrates that group managers exhibit own-group bias, echoing the fact that division managers exhibit own-division bias. 1 6 An alternative ‡ow of communication under hierarchy will be discussed in Section 6.
Figure 2: M-form and U-form
Equilibrium decisions
The four divisions are symmetric under each governance structure considered. As a result, the equilibrium decisions are also symmetric across divisions. 17 Here we only present the equilibrium decisions for D1. Speci…cally, under governance structure g = C; D; M; U , the equilibrium decisions for D1 take the following forms:
The detailed derivation and exact expressions for the decision weights can be found in the Appendix.
have similar forms, as in each case the decision maker for D1 has no private information about 1 . Moreover, a g 13 is strictly positive. This is because although there is no direct coordination link between D1 and D3, D3's message a¤ects d 2 and d 4 , which in turn a¤ects D1's payo¤.
For i 6 = j, recall that a g ij can be interpreted as D i 's accommodation of D j under g. To compare the decision weights across governance structures, denote s as D i 's strongly linked division and w as D i 's weakly linked division. For instance, for D1 the strongly linked division is D2 and the weakly linked division is D4. 1 7 All the dicisions are symmetric in the sense that the weights a 
Lemma 1
The following relationships hold for the equilibrium decision weights:
Part (i) of Lemma 1 basically states that, compared to centralization, under hierarchy decision weight a ij is bigger if D i and D j belong to the same group and smaller if D i and D j belong to di¤erent groups. This result is intuitive. Recall that each group manager only cares about his own two divisions, while the HQ cares about all four divisions. Group managers'own-group bias implies that under hierarchy, the across-division accommodations are higher for divisions within the same group, but lower for divisions across groups, relative to centralization. Since under M-form the strongly linked divisions are within the same group, while under U-form they belong to di¤erent groups, we have a M is > a C is > a U is . The opposite pattern holds for weakly linked divisions, which leads to a U iw > a C iw > a M iw . Part (ii) says that the own-decision weights under either hierarchy are always larger than those under centralization (a U ii > a C ii , and a M ii > a C ii ). This is again due to the group managers' owngroup bias. Because of this bias, relative to the HQ under centralization, a group manager is less willing to accommodate the two divisions in the other group, and thus will put more weights on the messages of his own two divisions. With a mild condition, which is su¢ cient but not necessary, the own-decision weight under U-form is larger than the own-decision weight under M-form. The main reason for this result is that under U-form the weak coordination links are internalized, while under M-form the strong coordination links are internalized. When the internalized coordination link is weaker, a group manager will reduce the rate of accommodation between his own two divisions and increase their own decision weights. This leads to a U ii > a M ii .
Quality of Communication
Recall that under each governance g considered, all of the divisions are symmetric. Therefore, given g; each division's communication bias is the same, which is denoted as b g . For g = C; U; M , the formula for communication bias, (3), can be simpli…ed as
By (4), the communication bias b g is decreasing in own-decision weight a g 11 and increasing in the ratios of accommodation to adaptation, . 18 To understand the result, note that division manager 1's ideal decision of d 1 is 1 . Without coordination concerns, division manager 1 would report v 1 = 1 =a g 11 . Thus his incentive to exaggerate is decreasing in a . When these ratios increase (move toward 1), the cost of exaggeration becomes smaller, and division manager 1 has a stronger incentive to exaggerate. Finally, we want to point out that a 
Proposition 2 establishes that under some mild conditions, 19 the quality of communication improves when the governance structure moves from centralization to M-form or moves from M-form to U-form. As pointed out earlier, the communication bias is decreasing in own-decision weight. Thus, technically, the result that
ii . More intuitively, relative to the HQ under centralization, the interest of division manager i is more aligned with his group manager under either U-from or M-form. As a result, communication is more informative under either U-form or M-form than under centralization. Between U-form and M-form, the interest of division manager i is more aligned with his group manager under U-form than under M-form. This is because under U-form a group manager internalizes a weak coordination link, while under M-form a group manager internalizes a strong coordination link. As a result, communication is more informative under U-form than under M-form. . Communication under decentralization is the least informative. This is not surprising, as a division manager's incentive is more aligned with the HQ than with other division managers. Under the other three organization forms, the quality of communication improves in the following order: centralization, M-form, and U-form. 20 Finally, as H increases, communication under decentralization improves, but communication under the other three organizational form worsens. The reason for this pattern is as follows. Under decentralization, as H increases division managers become more willing to accommodate each other, and thus the owndecision weight a D ii , which is induced adaptation, increases. Therefore, division managers'incentives to exaggerate are weakened. Under the other three organizational forms, as H increases the HQ or group managers will lower the own-decision weight a g ii and increase the accommodation weight a g ij . As a result, division managers'incentives to exaggerate become stronger. 
Relative performance
Given equilibrium decisions d g and communication biases b g , for each organizational form we can compute the ex ante expected performance under the most informative communication equilibrium, which is denoted as g (the detailed derivation is in the Appendix). De…ne the expected loss under g as L g . Since the four divisions are symmetric, we have
As in Rantakari (2008), we can decompose the expected losses under governance structure g (relative to the …rst best) into two components. The …rst component is due to distortions in decisions. Note that under centralization, there is no distortion in decisions. The second component of loss is due to noisy communication. Furthermore, this loss is a¤ected by two things: the quality of communication and the value of communication. Under centralization or either form of hierarchical governance, communication is essential to achieve adaptation. On the other hand, under decentralization, communication is mainly to achieve coordination. Figure 4 illustrates the optimal governance structure in the parameter space of L 2 [0:01; 0:5] and H 2 [ L ; 1]. In the …gure, we see that decentralization is optimal if both L and H are small. On the other hand, when both L and H are large, centralization is optimal. These results are not surprising, as centralization su¤ers from large adaptation losses (due to noisy communication) and decentralization su¤ers from large coordination losses (due to distortions in decisions). Thus centralization performs better than decentralization when the coordination needs ( L and H ) are The interesting case is when L is intermediate. In this case, one of the hierarchical governance structures is optimal. In particular, when H is close to L then U-form is optimal. On the other hand, when H is large then M-form is optimal. These results show that there is an area of parameter space under which introducing an intermediate level of managers is bene…cial, or hierarchy endogenously emerges.
To understand these results, let us …rst rank distortions in decisions across di¤erent governance structures. Recall that there is no distortion in decisions under centralization. Under both Uform and M-form, decisions are distorted due to group managers' own-group bias. Compared to decentralization, however, decisions under hierarchical governance are less distorted, as each group manager internalizes the coordination losses within his own group. Between U-form and M-form, distortions in decisions are smaller under M-form. This is because under M-form the strongly linked divisions are within the same group, while under U-form the strongly linked divisions are in di¤erent groups.
On the other hand, Proposition 2 shows that communication is more informative under hierarchy than under centralization. Therefore, relative to centralization, hierarchy leads to smaller adaptation losses. This improved communication under hierarchy makes it possible for hierarchy to outperform centralization.
Taken together, relative to decentralization, hierarchical governance leads to less distorted decisions, which implies smaller coordination losses. Relative to centralization, hierarchical governance achieves better adaptation due to more informative communication. Thus, under hierarchical governance coordination and adaptation are relatively more balanced, while centralization is good for coordination but bad for adaptation, and vice versa for decentralization. Starting from a very small L , as L (and hence H ) increases, relative to hierarchical governance, decentralization becomes worse because its distortions in decisions become more costly. On the other hand, starting from a large L , as L decreases, relative to hierarchical governance, centralization becomes worse because adaptation becomes relatively important. As a result, when L is in an intermediate range, such that adaptation needs and coordination needs are roughly equally important, hierarchical governance is optimal since it better balances adaptation and coordination.
Proposition 3 Suppose H = L = (M-form and U-form coincide). There exist a ' 0:09 and ' 0:26 such that decentralization is optimal when 2 (0; ), centralization is optimal when > , and hierarchy is optimal when 2 ( ; ).
Proposition 3 formally shows that hierarchical governance's being optimal does not require asymmetry of the coordination links. Even for a symmetric network ( H = L , the diagonal line in the …gure), hierarchical governance is optimal when the coordination need is intermediate. Intuitively, for an organization with more than two divisions, centralization sacri…ces too much adaptation due to noisy communication, since the interest of the HQ is too di¤used relative to individual division managers. On the other hand, decentralization sacri…ces too much coordination, again because individual division managers'interests are far away from the HQ's. By introducing an intermediate layer of management, hierarchical governance is able to achieve a better balance between adaptation and coordination. Therefore, it is the multiple number of divisions that makes hierarchical governance potentially optimal. Applying this insight, we expect similar results to hold in organizations with more than four divisions.
Between U-form and M-form, the …gure indicates that the region in which M-form is optimal is much larger than the region in which U-form is optimal. Moreover, more asymmetry among coordination links favors M-form over U-form: U-form is optimal only if H is close enough to L . The underlying reason for this pattern is as follows. Relative to M-form, the distortions in decisions are larger and the quality of communication is higher under U-form. Thus U-form is relatively good for adaptation but bad for coordination (closer to decentralization), while Mform is relatively good for coordination but bad for adaptation (closer to centralization). 21 As H increases, overall coordination becomes more important. As a result, M-form becomes more likely to be optimal.
However, asymmetry in coordination links indeed makes M-form more likely to be optimal in some sense. To see this, …x the overall weight of coordination L + H = . Starting from a point ( =2; =2) where centralization is optimal, as H increases (and L decreases), at some point M-form becomes the optimal governance. To understand why asymmetry in coordination links tends to make M-form optimal, let us compare M-form and centralization more closely. As H increases and L decreases, decisions under centralization and M-form are actually moving closer. This is because M-form internalizes the strong coordination links. As a result, the distortions in decisions under M-form become smaller; this e¤ect tends to make M-form more likely to be optimal. Moreover, this is also why the region in which hierarchical governance is optimal mainly depends on the weight of the weak coordination link, L .
Some anecdotal and empirical evidence is consistent with our prediction. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) state that …rms initially de…ne divisions to "minimize the connections among them" and "avoid the need for coordination across division boundaries." This essentially says that M-form is more likely to be better. Chandler (1962 Chandler ( , 1977 cites …rm diversi…cation as one of the main reasons that M-form becomes popular among large …rms; this pattern is veri…ed in an empirical study by Mahoney (1992) . This is consistent with our prediction. Firm diversi…cation reduces coordination needs among di¤erent products (i.e., the weights of the weak coordination links). As a result, …rms move from centralization to M-form.
Two Other Coordination Networks
Under the circle network studied earlier, the network positions of all divisions are symmetric. In this section we study two other coordination networks, i.e. the star and the line, under which di¤erent divisions have di¤erent network positions. In addition to centralization, decentralization, and hierarchy, we will consider other governance structures, such as partial centralization/decentralization and some hybrid organization forms. It turns out that hierarchy or a mixture of hierarchy and centralization remain the optimal governance forms for these coordination networks.
Star Network
In this subsection we study a star coordination network, which is illustrated in Figure 5 . Speci…cally, there is a center division that has coordination links with each other division, while there is no coordination link between any pair of other divisions. Such coordination networks are common in the real world. For a concrete example, consider a …rm consisting of one production division and three marketing divisions, each of which is responsible for selling products in a separate region. The decision of the production division must be coordinated with that of each marketing division, while the decisions of the marketing divisions do not need to be directly coordinated with each other, since they sell products in separate regions. In this example, the production division is the 
D1 is centralized, while D2, D3, and D4 are decentralized D1CO D1 is decentralized, while D2, D3, and D4 are centralized C1H D1 is centralized, while D2, D3, and D4 form a group Table 1 : Notations for Alternative Governance under A Star Coordination Network center division, while the three marketing divisions are the peripheral divisions. 22 Speci…cally, D1 is the center division. For each i 6 = 1, 1i = > 0, and ii = 1. We set 11 = > 0, and will vary it as a parameter. Given the speci…cation, the three peripheral divisions are symmetric, which we will label as D i . 23 We consider …ve governance structures, which are listed in Table 1 . In addition to centralization and decentralization, we will study two partial centralization/decentralization governance modes: C1DO and D1CO. The governance C1H is a hybrid governance that combines centralization and hierarchy. Speci…cally, for the group manager of the three peripheral divisions for which he makes the decisions, his incentive is to maximize the joint payo¤ for the three divisions. Note that all these governance structures are quasi-symmetric, in that the allocation of decision rights is the same for divisions with the same network position.
For equilibrium decisions, we only present those under C1DO and C1H. All of the detailed 2 2 For another example, consider a diversi…ed …rm with one …nance division and three product divisions, each of which sells unrelated products. In this case the …nance division is the center division and the three product divisions are peripheral divisions, since they sell unrelated products and thus do not need to be directly coordinated with each other. 2 3 Symmetry is imposed in order to reduce computational burden.
derivations and expressions of decision weights can be found in the Appendix. Speci…cally, under C1DO, equilibrium decisions are given by
And under C1H, equilibrium decisions are given by
Due to the symmetry of the three peripheral divisions, under each governance structure g, a
(ii) Across centralization and decentralization, a C 11 > a D 11 , and
, and all other corresponding decision weights are the same across C1DO and C1H.
Part (i) of Lemma 2 illustrates how a division's network position a¤ects its own-decision weight. To facilitate the comparison, we normalize = 1 to make the need for adaptation the same across all divisions. Under centralization, the center division's own-decision weight is lower than peripheral division's (a C 11 < a C ii ). However, under decentralization the relationship is the opposite (a D 11 > a D ii ). To understand this result, note that under either centralization or decentralization, D1 and each D i are equally accommodating for each other. 24 Since D1 has three coordination links-while Di only has one-under centralization overall D1 accommodates more of other divisions, which leads to a smaller adaptation weight a C 11 . Under decentralization, a division's own message a¤ects its own decision only by a¤ecting the decisions of other divisions. In other words, a D 11 and a D ii are induced adaptation. Since D1 is the center, D1's message directly a¤ects the three divisions'decisions, and thus its induced adaptation a D 11 is higher than a D ii . Part (ii) shows that the own-decision weights are higher under centralization than under decentralization. This result is not surprising, as under decentralization a D 11 and a D ii represent induced adaptation, while under centralization a C 11 and a C ii represent adaptation. Part (iii) compares centralization and partial centralization/decentralization, and the results can be understood as follows. Compared to centralization, under partial centralization/decentralization the divisions that remain centralized become more accommodating of the decentralized divisions, and their own-decision weights decrease. To understand the intuition, compare C1DO and centralization. Since under C1DO the three peripheral divisions are decentralized, they accommodate less of D1's decision. As a result, the HQ, which cares about all divisions, responds by increasing D1's accommodation of other divisions, thus reducing D1's own adaptation. The intuition for part (iv) is similar: Compared to decentralization, under partial centralization/decentralization the divisions that remain decentralized become less accommodating of the centralized divisions, and their own-decision weights increase.
Part (v) compares decision weights across C1H and C1DO. Between these two governance structures, the only di¤erence is that under the former the three peripheral divisions form a group, while under the latter they are decentralized. Since the three peripheral divisions have no direct coordination link with each other, the group manager under C1H does not internalize any coordination link. In other words, the group manager's incentive is almost perfectly aligned with that of individual division managers. As a result, all decision weights are the same across C1H and C1DO, except that a C1H
ii (under C1DO, D i 's adaptation weight equals to D i 's direct adaptation plus induced adaptation). The di¤erence is due to the fact that under C1H the group manager does not directly observe local conditions.
The following proposition compares divisions'incentives to exaggerate under various governance structures.
Part (i) of Proposition 4 shows that there is a range of ( 2 (1; b )) such that, under centralization, relative to the peripheral divisions, the center division's communication is less informative, while under decentralization the center division's communication is more informative. This result is di¤erent from Rantakari (2008): In his setting, under either centralization or decentralization, the more dependant division's communication is always more noisy. 25 This result is closely related to the comparison of own-decision weights across divisions. As pointed out earlier (when = 1), under centralization the center division's own-decision weight is lower relative to the peripheral division's (a C 11 < a C ii ). As a result, the center division has a stronger incentive to exaggerate its own state. Under decentralization, however, the center division's own-decision weight is higher relative to peripheral division's own-decision weight (a D 11 > a D ii ). This implies that D1's incentive to exaggerate is relatively lower. Taken together, there is a range of such that D1's communication is relatively more informative than the peripheral divisions' communication under decentralization, but relatively less informative under centralization.
Part (ii) shows that, compared to decentralization, under partial centralization/decentralization the quality of communication is improved for the divisions that are still decentralized. This result is intuitive. When some division(s) are centralized, the HQ makes these divisions'decisions more accommodating. As a result, the decentralized divisions'induced adaptations increase, and their incentives to exaggerate decrease. For instance, as shown in Lemma 26 Again, we denote the overall expected loss under g as L g . The following proposition compares the relative performance of various governance structures when = 1. In broad terms, Proposition 5 shows that under the star coordination network, partial centralization/decentralization cannot be optimal. The optimal governance is decentralization when the need for coordination is low, centralization when the need for coordination is high, and (hybrid) hierarchy when the need for coordination is intermediate. This pattern is consistent with the pattern discovered under the circle network.
To understand why partial centralization/decentralization cannot be optimal, …rst compare C1H and C1DO. As mentioned earlier, under C1H the group manager does not internalize any coordination link. This means that the decisions of the three peripheral divisions under C1H are almost as distorted as those under C1DO. Compared to C1H, the adaptations of the three peripheral divisions under C1DO are better, since the division managers have the decision rights. However, 2 6 When = 1, it can be shown that b as shown in Proposition 4, compared to C1DO, under C1H the quality of communication of the peripheral divisions is much higher. This communication advantage has two layers of implication. First, relative to C1DO, the loss in adaptation of the peripheral divisions under C1H is small. Second, the improved communication under C1H can signi…cantly reduce the coordination loss relative to C1DO. This is because under C1DO, each peripheral division's decision varies with its own local condition, but other divisions only observe a noisy message from that division; thus, noisy communication hurts coordination. 27 As a result, C1H always dominates C1DO. 28 Next we compare the two governance structures of partial centralization/decentralization: D1CO and C1DO. It turns out that there is a region of such that C1DO outperforms D1CO, centralization, and decentralization. On the other hand, D1CO cannot outperform centralization and decentralization at the same time. This shows that C1DO is a better organizational form than D1CO. This result is in contrast to the one in Rantakari (2008) , where the better partial centralization governance is to decentralize the more dependent division. In our model, D1 is the more dependent division, yet the better partial centralization/decentralization governance is to have D1 centralized. To understand the intuition for this result, note that under both governance structures, coordination losses are more or less the same. This is because for each coordination link, decentralizing the center division and decentralizing the peripheral divisions lead to similar coordination losses. However, under C1DO only the adaptation of D1 is sacri…ced, while under D1CO the adaptations of the three peripheral divisions are sacri…ced. Therefore, centralizing the center division D1 leads to a smaller overall adaptation loss, or C1DO performs better than D1CO.
Finally, the reason that C1H can outperform both centralization and decentralization at the same time is again that under C1H, coordination and adaptation are more balanced. Speci…cally, under C1H the three coordination links are also partially internalized (center division D1 is centralized). Relative to decentralization, C1H improves coordination but sacri…ces the adaptation of D1. Relative to centralization, C1H improves the adaptation of the three peripheral divisions but sacri…ces coordination. As a result, when coordination need is intermediate, CIH is optimal. This shows that introducing hierarchy is bene…cial even if a group manager does not internalize any coordination link. The bene…t of hierarchy is that it induces higher quality communication among the managers of the peripheral divisions. Figure 6 illustrates the optimal governance structure in the parameter space of = [0:01; 2] 2 . For a given , the pattern is similar to the pattern when = 1: as increases, the optimal governance moves from decentralization to C1H and then to centralization. Moreover, partial centralization/decentralization can never be optimal. The …gure also demonstrates the following 2 7 Under C1H noisy communication does not a¤ect coordination, since all decision makers have no private information. 2 8 This holds even when ! 0. The reason is that when ! 0, under C1H b As increases, the range of under which decentralization is optimal expands, while the range of under which C1H is optimal shrinks. To see this, recall that relative to decentralization, under C1H the adaptation of D1 is sacri…ced. As increases, the adaptation of D1 becomes more important. Consequently, decentralization performs relatively better than C1H. 29 
Line Network
Consider a line network, which is illustrated in Figure 7 . For each division i, adaptation need ii is normalized to 1. The coordination links 12 and 34 have the same weight: 12 = 34 = , while coordination link 23's weight is 23 = . In the speci…cation, D1 and D4 are symmetric and are relatively peripheral; D2 and D3 are symmetric, and relatively central.
In terms of network structure, a line network lies somewhere between a star and a circle: It is more symmetric than a star, but more asymmetric than a circle. Line coordination networks are also relevant in the real world. For a concrete example, consider a …rm consisting of four divisions, each of which sells a di¤erent product. The relationships among the four products are described by a line network: products 1 and 2 are related (i.e., they share common components or marketing); products 2 and 3 are related; and products 3 and 4 are related. No other pairs are directly related. 30 The main purpose of this subsection is for robustness check-that is, whether the insights D1 and D2 form a group, and D3 and D4 form another group H23 D2 and D3 form a group, and D1 and D4 form another group D14G23 D1 and D4 are decentralized, while D2 and D3 form a group G14D23 D1 and D4 form a group, while D2 and D3 are decentralized G14C23 D1 and D4 form a group, while D2 and D3 are centralized C14G23 D1 and D4 are centralized, while D2 and D3 form a group Table 2 : Notations for Alternative Governance under A Line Coordination Network obtained under the circle network and the star network also apply to the line network. In particular, we are interested in the comparison between partial centralization/decentralization and hierarchical governance structures. We will consider 10 governance structures, which (along with the notations) are summarized in Table 2 .
Note that all of the above governance structures are quasi-symmetric, as the allocation of decision rights is symmetric for divisions with the same network position. As a result, under each governance g considered, D1 and D4 are symmetric and D2 and D3 are symmetric, both in terms of decisions and communication. In the rest of the subsection, we will only compare the relative performance of various governance structures. The detailed analysis can be found in an online appendix.
The following …gure illustrates the optimal organization structure in the parameter space ( ; . Again, decentralization is optimal only when both and are very small, and centralization is optimal when both and are large. When is small but is large, hierarchical governance H12 is optimal. When is very small and is not too small, hierarchical governance H23 is optimal. When is small and is relatively large, hybrid governance G14C23 is optimal. Partial centralization/decentralization and other hybrid governance structures can never be optimal.
To understand the results, let's separate the parameter space roughly by the line = =2. Above this line, coordination links 12 and 34 are relatively more important than coordination link 23; below this line, coordination link 23 is relatively more important. Abusing terminology, in the upper region (above the line), governance H12 can be considered as M-form, as the strong coordination links are internalized, while governance H23 is U-form as the weak coordination link is internalized. In the lower region, the pattern is reversed: H12 is U-form, while H23 is M-form. As shown in Section 4, relative to M-form, U-form improves the quality of communication, and thus adaptation, but worsens coordination. In the upper region, when is small, overall coordination is less important relative to adaptation, and thus U-form (H23) is optimal. When is large and is small, overall coordination becomes relatively important, and thus M-form (H12) is optimal. In the lower region, when is small and is small, U-form (H12) is optimal (a tiny region, which is not shown in the …gure). 31 But for large , M-form (H23) dominates U-form (H12). This pattern is consistent with the results under the circle network.
The result that partial centralization/decentralization cannot be optimal is consistent with the result under the star network. The intuition is also the same. For a given organizational structure of partial centralization/decentralization, there is a corresponding hybrid (hierarchical) governance in which the two decentralized divisions form a group that performs better. The main reason is that introducing hierarchy for the two decentralized divisions improves these two divisions' communication, which in turn improves coordination. 32 For the same reason, hybrid governance that combines decentralization and hierarchy (G14D23 and D14G23) cannot be optimal either.
Finally, we compare H23, centralization, and two hybrid governance structures, G14C23 and C14G23, when is relatively large. Note that both C14G23 and G14C23 lie between H23 and centralization. In particular, under either C14G23 or G14C23, the coordination links 12 and 34 are partially internalized. When governance moves from H23 to G14C23 and to centralization, coordination becomes better overall. As a result, when the coordination links 12 and 34 become more important ( increases), the optimal organization form changes from H23 to G14C23 and to centralization.
Between the two hybrid governance structures, C14G23 is never optimal, while G14C23 could be optimal. In other words, if an organization adopts a hybrid governance that combines centralization and hierarchy, then the central divisions-instead of the peripheral divisions-should be centralized. The underlying driving force for this result is the di¤erence in communication quality. 33 Relative to H23, under C14G23 the communication quality of the two peripheral divisions D1 and D4 is signi…cantly worsened. This is because there is no direct coordination link between D1 and D4, which implies that D1's and D4's incentives are aligned almost perfectly with their group manager's under H23. As a result, the adaptations of D1 and D4 are worsened signi…cantly under C14G23. On the other hand, relative to H23, under G14C23 the communication quality of the two central divisions D2 and D3 is only slightly worsened. This is because the weight of coordination link 23, , is relatively large. This implies that even under H23, communication between D2 and D3 is quite noisy. Therefore, relative to H23, under G14C23 the adaptation of D2 and D3 is only slightly worsened. Taken together, G14C23 performs better than C14G23.
Some empirical evidence supports our prediction. In a study of multinational …rms, Colombo and Delmastro (2004) …nd that the allocation of decision rights can be di¤erent across di¤erent subsidiaries. They also show that the degree of decentralization in an organization is negatively correlated with intra-…rm interdependencies. Abernethy et al. (2004) show that delegation of decision rights is less likely for divisions that are more dependent. This is consistent with our last prediction, that central divisions are more likely to be centralized than peripheral divisions.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we study adaptation versus coordination in a multidivisional organization with endogenous communication, and compare relative performance across di¤erent organizational structures. Under a circle coordination network, we …nd that hierarchy emerges as an optimal governance structure when coordination needs are intermediate. Compared with centralization and decentralization, communication under hierarchy is more informative. Consequently, hierarchy achieves a better balance between adaptation and coordination, and thus outperforms both centralization and decentralization when coordination and adaptation are roughly equally important. Between M-form and U-form hierarchical organizations, U-form organization leads to more informative communication and adapts better to local conditions, but results in worse coordination among divisions. As the need for coordination of the strong coordination links increases, the optimal governance moves from U-form to M-form.
We further study star and line coordination networks, under which divisions have asymmetric network positions. One pattern we found is that partial centralization/decentralization can never be optimal, but hierarchy or hybrid hierarchy can be optimal. In particular, grouping divisions together and introducing a group manager is bene…cial even if the divisions within the group have no direct coordination link with each other. This result is again driven by the fact that introducing hierarchy improves the quality of communication. Taken together, these results suggest that introducing a middle layer of management is bene…cial to organizations, as the middle managers, via improved communication, are able to strike a better balance between adaptation and coordination.
In our analysis, we have restricted our attention to the case of four divisions. However, we expect that our main insights regarding hierarchy as an optimal mode of governance will continue to hold for organizations with more than four divisions. This is because grouping divisions together improves communication, as individual division managers'incentives are more aligned with those of group managers than with those of HQ or other division managers. Consequently, hierarchy can achieve a better balance between adaptation and coordination, and thus outperforms centralization and decentralization when the need for coordination is intermediate.
We have assumed that hierarchy does not change the ‡ow of communication. Speci…cally, under hierarchical governance the communication is still one-round and public. We believe this is a reasonable assumption, because we focus on decision-making and communication at the top management level. Alternatively, one could assume that with hierarchy there will be two rounds of communication: Division managers communicate to their group manager in the …rst round, and then the two group managers communicate with each other in the second round. Although this is an interesting and realistic format for communication, it signi…cantly complicates the model and makes it very hard to solve. The di¢ culty mainly comes from the fact that group managers could manipulate the information they received in the …rst stage when they send messages in the second stage. We leave this option for future research. 34 Finally, we have assumed that the division managers are completely sel…sh or only care about the payo¤s of their own divisions. In reality, division managers may care about the payo¤s of other divisions to some degree. This is especially true when their payo¤ is somewhat tied to the performance of the whole organization. As shown by ADM, making division managers'incentives more aligned with the HQ's will improve the relative performance of decentralization, thus making it more likely to be the optimal organizational form. Following their logic, we expect that our main insight-i.e. that hierarchy performs better than centralization and decentralization when the needs for coordination are intermediate-will continue to hold as long as each division manager has an own-division bias. This is because when the division managers are biased, under hierarchy group managers'incentives will still be more aligned with division managers'relative to the HQ or other division managers. 35 This implies that communication is more informative under hierarchy, and thus it is able to achieve a better balance between adaptation and coordination. 3 4 In the cheap talk literature, we are aware of no paper that deals with two rounds of communication, in which receivers in the …rst round act as senders in the second round. 3 5 For instance, suppose division manager i's objective is to maximize i + (1 ) P j6 =i j , where 2 (1=2; 1]. Similarly, suppose under hierarchy, group manager G's objective is to maximize P i2G i + (1 ) P j = 2G j . Given any , it is easy to verify that division manager i's incentive is more aligned with his group manager's than with the HQ's or other division managers'. 
Using m i;k = (x 
where b g i is given by (3). The rest of the proof follows Proposition 2 in ADM. In particular, for each positive integer K (the number of partition elements), there is an equilibrium characterized by (6) . Moreover, the informativeness of the communication equilibria is increasing in K, and in the most informative equilibrium, K ! 1. The equilibrium partition points in the most informative equilibrium can be analytically solved, which yields E[(m
Equilibrium decisions under the circle network. We only demonstrate how to derive the equilibrium decisions under M-form, as the derivations under other governance structures are similar. Speci…cally, under M-form manager G1 controls D1 and D2, and manager G2 controls D3 and D4. Given message m, manager G1 chooses d 1 and d 2 to maximize the joint payo¤ of D1 and D2. This yields G1's best responses as follows:
Similarly, manager G2's best responses are (7)- (10), we get the equilibrium decision weights.
Under centralization, the optimal decision weights a C 1j are given by
;
Under decentralization, the equilibrium decision weights a D 1j are given by
The equilibrium decision weights under U-form, a U 1j , are given by
Finally, under M-form the equilibrium decision weights a M 1j are given by
Proof of Lemma 1. Proof. Part (i). Due to the symmetry among divisions, we only need to show that the results hold for D1. Note that for D1, the strongly linked division s is D2, and the weakly linked division w is D4. By the equilibrium decision weights, we have
Part (ii). By the equilibrium decision weights, we have
where the …rst two inequalities use condition H L 0:5, and the last inequality follows H + L 1:5. Note that the second inequality implicitly assumes that 
Take the di¤erence,
Similarly,
From Lemma 1, we know that a U 11 > a M 11 . Thus to show b M 1 > b U 1 , by (4) the following condition is su¢ cient: [
0. This is because in the formula of the communication bias, (4), the …rst term's (which is positive) coe¢ cient H is bigger than the second term's (which is negative) coe¢ cient L . Overall,
. By earlier results,
Taking the di¤erence, we can show that
and
From Lemma 1, we have a M 11 > a C 11 . By (4), if
. Since H 1, the following conditions are su¢ cient for
> 0. But they have been proved
Performance of various organization forms under the circle network Again we just demonstrate how to compute the expected loss under M-form. Since the four divisions are symmetric, we only need to compute the expected loss for D1. In particular, under M-form the expected adaptation loss and coordination losses are:
Proof of Proposition 3. Proof. Denote the hierarchy governance as H. Setting H = L = , we can simplify the equilibrium decision weights and the formula of the communication biases. In particular, De…ne the RHS of (17) as F HC ( ). It is easy to verify that F HC ( ) > 0 for any 1. Moreover, F HC (1) > 0 and F HC (0) < 0. Thus, by the continuity of F HC ( ), there is some 2 (0; 1) such that F HC ( ) = 0. Now we show that such a is unique. Denote s as solutions to F HC ( s ) = 0. And without loss, suppose is the smallest s . First, we show that F 0 HC ( s ) > 0 for any s . Denote the terms in the …rst bracket of (17) as X( ), and the terms in the second bracket of (17) as Y ( ). Then F HC ( ) = X( ) Y ( ) 1. Since F HC ( s ) = 0, we have X( s ) > Y ( s ). Taking derivative with respect to , we have
Next we show that there is no s > . Since F 0 HC ( ) > 0 and F HC ( ) = 0, the continuity of F HC ( ) implies that for the next s , F HC ( ) must across 0 from above; in other words, F 0 HC ( s ) < 0. But this contradicts the earlier result that F 0 HC ( s ) > 0. Therefore, s is unique, which is . Since is the unique solution to F HC ( ) = 0 and F HC (0) < 0, the continuity of F HC ( ) implies that F HC ( ) > 0 if > , and F HC ( ) < 0 if < . Therefore, L H L C > 0 if > , and L H L C < 0 if < . It can be computed that ' 0:26.
Next, we compare decentralization and hierarchy. Speci…cally, by (15) Since > , the earlier comparisons lead to the following conclusion: among L C , L H , and L D , L D is the smallest when 2 (0; ), L C is the smallest when > , and L H is the smallest when 2 ( ; ).
Equilibrium decisions under the star network
The equilibrium decision weights under various governance structures are as follows. 
Taking expectations over (19) and (20) (19) and (20), we get the equilibrium decision weights a C1DO ij as shown earlier.
Proof of Lemma 2. Proof. Parts (i) and (ii) are immediate from the equilibrium decision weights.
Part (iii). By the equilibrium decision weights, we have 
Taking derivative of (21) with respect to , we get @b C 1 @ < 0. As to the di¤erence, (21) and (22) 
The result is immediate from the expressions of (23) and (24) .
Part (ii). The communication bias b D1CO
The overall expected loss under C1DO can be computed from (28)-(30).
Proof of Proposition 5. Proof. When = 1, the expected losses L g can be computed as follows: By a proof similar to that of Proposition 3, there is a unique 2 such that L C1H L C > 0 if > 2 , and L C1H L C < 0 if < 2 . It can be computed that 2 ' 0:31. Similarly, it can be shown that there is a unique 1 such that L D L C1H > 0 if > 1 , and L D L C1H < 0 if < 1 . It can be computed that 1 ' 0:08 < 2 . Therefore, decentralization is optimal if < 1 , centralization is optimal if > 2 , and C1H is optimal when 2 ( 1 ; 2 ).
